Bancarization and cost of the social norm in Morocco

Résumé

Despite an abundant literature on the relationship between the social norm and the preferences
of individuals within a community, it does not prevent us from detecting considerable
disagreement on the effects of the social norm on preferences. This article attempts to
empirically estimate the relationship between the Islamic principles considered as a social
norm prohibiting the interest rate and the possession of a bank account granting possibilities
of interest credit in Morocco. An interesting remark in this country is to note a divergence
among a majority of the population between the social norm and the holding of bank accounts
offering the possibility of credit. Therefore, this empirical study can offer a considerable
advantage in determining the reasons for this discrepancy. It is shown that the cost of the social
norm of informing each other to exclude holders of interest-bearing bank accounts can
constitute a brake on the application of the social norm. Indeed, Indeed, the larger the
population and banking density, the more dispersed the information and the higher its cost,
thereby, reducing the cost effect of the social norm in relation to the expected gains from
holding the bank account. Our estimates show that the cost of the social norm on the holding
of the bank account by Moroccans is low.